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This article aims to examine the conduct and policies of Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bris-
tol, the American High Commissioner to Turkey, in the hope of shining light on Woodrow 
Wilson’s post-war aims. Ultimately, it aims to explore the relation between Bristol’s ac-
tions and Wilson’s political desires. A century after he drafting and signing of the Treaty 
of Versailles, there remains a debate about Woodrow Wilson and Wilsonianism. Several 
questions immediately arise. To what extent was Preident Wilson a thoroughly committed 
idealist, who truly desired to create a new liberal international order? To what extent were 
his aims primarily realist in nature? Did he make extravagant promises that were designed 
to cover up solidly realist intentions? If so, did he do this in order to gain public approval 
for casting away longstanding American traditions against becoming involved in European 
affairs? As for Rear Admiral Bristol, does his conduct in the Near East coincide with Wil-
sonian ideas and ideals? 
The first question to be asked, however, is what was the general context in which Bris-
tol was operating? America’s conception of itself and of its role in the world had, by the 
end of the First World War, substantially evolved. As American industry expanded in the 
late 19th century, the search for markets abroad naturally rmped up. However, until the 
1890s, direct American involvement abroad was typically limited to Central and South 
American. This changed dramatically after the Spanish-American War of 1898, which re-
sulted in America’s acquisition of colonies in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Now, 
established as an imperial power in the Pacific, the United States sought to access the mar-
kets of China. However, the Unites States found itself at a serious disadvantage. The great 
powers already held trade ports in China and shut the door to other powers in their sphere 
of influence. In addition, the US worried that great power rivalries in the Far East would 
lead to the partitioning of China, which in turn could lead to a war that would disrupt trade 
and create greater insecurity for American merchants. But the McKinley administration 
held on to the American tradition of avoiding entangli g alliances, and refused an offer of 
military alliance from Great Britain that was designed to ensure Chinese territorial integrity. 
With direct military intervention out of the question, Secretary of State John Hay, taking 
inspiration from a memorandum written by British customs agent Alfred Hippisley, pro-
posed the Open Door to the other great powers in Cha.1 The Open Door became a central 
American policy, and would later be invoked by Bristol when dealing with other major 
powers in Asia Minor. Initially, however, it was employed mainly to establish free trade, or 
                                                




at least freer trade, within China, and as such it aimed to reduce tensions, encourage eco-
nomic investment, and give the United States an opportunity to enter the region without the 
need to claim a trade port for itself. 
Teddy Roosevelt began, in the early 20th century, to promote a broader international role 
for the US, but it was not until the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 that a clear and 
broadly conceived view of America’s international ro e began to be enunciated. America’s 
successful involvement in the First World War, as well as the damage suffered by the other 
major powers, gave this enunciation greater weight than it might otherwise have had. In the 
Middle East, increased American presence came about for a number of reasons. First, 
though perhaps not mostly importantly, it was recognized that there were clear possibilities 
for American industries, businesses and banks to gain m rkets and to acquire access to raw 
materials. Second, Wilson himself promoted broader American involvement to help ensure 
postwar peace settlements were adhered to. For one thing, this meant direct American in-
volvement for the first time in Near East affairs since Wilson accepted, initially at least, the 
proposal that America should guarantee the security of he planned Armenian mandate. In 
part, this explains why Admiral Bristol was dispatched as American High Commissioner to 
Turkey. Eventually, however, Wilson became less enthusiastic about the Armenian man-
date as it became clear that the British and French had proposed American control over 
Armenia largely because, unlike the mandates they sought to procure, it promised little op-
portunity for profit and would in fact be expensive to maintain. In any case, Admiral Bristol 
took a very pragmatic view, downplayed the atrocities against the Armenians, and did his 
best to shelve any possibility of an American mandate. 
Second, we need to look at the question of whether Wilson was a realist or an idealist, 
which runs parallel with another debate concerning what exactly is meant by political ideal-
ism or realism. Erez Manela offers some hints that might help in defining “idealism” and 
“realism”. In “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East–West Harmony and 
the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” he notes: 
 
“Along with the millions in Europe who cheered Wilson upon his arrival there, Indi-
ans and Chinese saw Wilson’s wartime rhetoric as a blueprint for a more peaceful 
and inclusive international order, one in which Asian nations could achieve a 
greater measure of equality and sovereignty.”2 
 
With this observation in mind, this article will define “idealism” as being a political phi-
losophy intent on creating, as Manela puts it, a more peaceful and inclusive international 
order. Conversely, “realism” can be seen as politica  conduct in foreign affairs aimed at ad-
vancing the perceived interests of the state in the realm of military, diplomatic, and eco-
nomic power.3 
It is common to believe that after the First World War, America, as if under the influ-
ence of cultural and political gravity, rapidly desc nded back to the isolationist traditions 
that had, to a great extent, guided the nation’s foreign policy since its founding. Largely ig-
nored today, at least among the general public, are the implications of Wilson’s failure at 
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Paris to make good on his declared vision for a newinternational order, as well as his fail-
ure to exact from his European allies a peace treaty th t was actually based on his Fourteen 
Points, as was promised to both the people of Germany and the United States.4 The degree 
to which responsibility for the Second World War can be laid on the Treaty of Versailles is 
still debated by scholars, but that the treaty embittered the citizens of a newly democratized 
Germany is commonly accepted. What is far less acknowledged today is how the conduct 
of Allied leaders and President Wilson led to the disillusionment of American voters and 
their representatives in Congress. 
As the peace conference moved forward, the victorious nations began to look at each 
other as potential rivals. Britain saw America as it’ only possible naval rival. France 
viewed British expansion as a potential threat. Italy looked to expand in the Mediterranean 
to the consternation of France and Britain both. Meanwhile, the ascent of the Bolsheviks 
was met with a sense of panic and impotent frustration. American officials viewed allies’ 
territorial expansion as an impingement on potential exports, and as a violation of the ideals 
that had rallied the nation to war. In the realm of international politics, America felt re-
buffed, but would continue as it had before the war, fostering economic relations. The busi-
ness of America, after all, was business. However, th  willingness of Americans to under-
take any new overseas adventures was largely exhausted. It was in this environment of frus-
tration with their old allies, and a withdrawal of America from European political affairs 
that the American officers, sailors, missionaries, and officials found themselves while serv-
ing in the Near East in the aftermath of the First World War. 
Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol was fifty years old when he arrived in Constantinople 
and raised the US flag on his command ship, the converted yacht Scorpion at the end of 
January 1919. His career in the United States Navy h d spanned thirty-six years.5 Of inter-
est is the fact that when Admiral Bristol was appointed the American High Commissioner 
to Turkey, he had next to no foreign policy experienc ; his previous posts had primarily in-
volved the application of his technical expertise in fields such as naval aviation and torpedo 
maintenance, and he had spent twenty-one years of hi navy career at sea.6 Bristol’s journey 
to his new command began in Plymouth, England, where he’d been commander of the 
American naval facilities.7 After receiving his orders in London in December, 1918, Bristol 
travelled to Paris. Here he met with the American delegation and spoke in person with 
President Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, a d Herbert Hoover of the Food Ad-
ministration. His instructions could essentially be summed up as “do what is right, and pro-
tect American interests.” More specifically, he was to oversee the conditions of armistice 
with the Ottomans, as well as provide support for the Near East Relief and examine the 
possibilities for mandates in the region. His range of command was to include the waters of 
the Near East, Black Sea and Greece.8 
Admiral Bristol’s knowledge of the Near East seems to have been based on three 
events: his meeting with officials in Paris, a quick read through former American Ambas-
sador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau’s memoirs, and a conversation with a 
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former American missionary. This missionary, Bristol claimed, had informed him that the 
peoples of the Near East were ignorant of the difference between right and wrong.9 In short, 
Bristol was assigned to his new command because of his reputation as a military officer, 
not because of his knowledge of the region. His chief responsibilities, and America’s chief 
interests, in Anatolia and in the Black Sea region were to ensure the lives and property of 
American missionaries, to assist American business interests, and to help alleviate the un-
folding humanitarian crises of the region. 
Anyone searching through the Bristol files in the Library of Congress, or reading 
through secondary sources concerning his position, is sure to rapidly conclude that High 
Commissioner Bristol’s primary focus was on defending and advancing American business 
interests in the region. These actions were often an attempt to counter the restrictions placed 
on American business by the other Allied nations, especially Britain. Specifically, Bristol 
was attempting to advance the old Open Door policy. Thomas Bryson notes, in his article 
“Admiral Mark L. Bristol, an Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey”, that the Allies were hinder-
ing American trade through a consumption tax that impeded American exports to Turkey 
— a tax that was not in accordance with US-Turkish trade agreements. Further, the Allies 
controlled trade via an Advisory Trade Committee to which they refused the United States 
membership. Lastly, the Allies in Paris had aligned the arrangement of mandates to ensure 
that the United States did not have access to the oil rich regions of Mesopotamia.10 Bristol 
would do his utmost to undo these restrictions, even going so far as to suggest to one 
American businessman that he establish a price-fixing syndicate, along with other Ameri-
can businesses, to challenge competitors from other Allied nations.11 From this, it would 
seem that Bristol was intent on advancing American n tional interests, in line with a typical 
realist approach to foreign relations, and on continuing the Navy’s “open door” tradition of 
supporting American trade and business. 
However, Bristol’s worries about Allied conduct in Asia Minor appear to be partly 
based in the idealist tradition and partly in the realist tradition. He was clearly concerned 
with avoiding a future war in the region by preventing further territorial partitioning and by 
forcing economic equality among the Allies, but he also wanted to promote American 
commercial interests. While attending an investigation into the Greek landing at Smyrna, 
Bristol wrote from Paris in November 1919 on the need for an American policy towards 
Turkey. In it he observes: 
 
“The altruistic reasons for American intervention in Turkish affairs are well known. 
For those to whom altruism carries no conviction two arguments based on selfish-
ness may suffice: first, the argument of National Safety; secondly, that of Protection 
to our National Interests. 
(1) In the interest of peace we ought not to permit a patchwork division of Turkey, 
based on the spoils system and callous to local sentim t, such as will certainly be 
made if America holds aloof. No Power except the United States can prevent the 
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carrying into effect of those notorious “secret” agreements, which would lead cer-
tainly to war and probably to another world-war. 
We ought therefore to join in the Turkish Treaty, and refuse to permit such a settle-
ment even if the refusal costs us money and trouble. 
(2) If the United States takes no part, or an apathetic part, in the settlement of the 
Near East, its material interests must suffer incalculably. Commercial opportunities 
in Turkey, as well as in the Ottoman territories placed under mandates, will be lost 
to the United States if it keeps aloof. The only wato maintain in Turkey our tradi-
tional trade policy of the "open door" is to be on the spot and hold the door open.” 
 
Bristol’s outlining of his mission clearly echoes the Open Door policy as it was con-
ceived in relation to China. He wishes to avoid a “p tchwork division” of Turkey in the be-
lief that such a partitioning would lead to future wars, a concern American officials had 
raised earlier with regard to China. Concerning how t  avoid future war, Bristol is essen-
tially clear in his thinking and his motives are sound. However, in regard to the Ottoman 
Empire having siding with the Central Powers, the Turkish campaign of ethnic cleansing 
during the war, and the unfolding post war conflicts in Anatolia. 
In consistently ignoring Turkey’s actions, Bristol’s reports become deeply skewed, and 
sometimes puerile. His most glaring omission in his reports is any attempt to come to terms 
either with the war-time pogroms against Christian mi orities in Turkish territories or with 
the continued post war ethnic cleansing both of the Armenians who managed to return to 
their pillaged properties and of the Greek civilians i  Asia Minor. These and other minori-
ties were now threatened with a new Turkish National st ttempt to ethnically purify their 
future state. Moreover, Bristol repeatedly excuses Turkish massacres by highlighting ethnic 
cleansing perpetrated by Armenians and Greeks. In his work America’s Black Sea Fleet, 
Robert Shenk writes that Bristol’s downplaying of the wartime atrocities, as well as those 
occurring during his tenure, are driven by a “pragmtic naïveté”.12 
It was not that Bristol was wholly or even partly ignorant of the grim details of the 
crimes that had taken place. Yet, when describing the crimes, he is capable of shifting, al-
most in one breath, from the mildest depiction of the events in question to a depiction of 
their full horror and then proceed to lay part of the blame for the deportations and massa-
cres on the victims themselves. For example, shortly af er his first excursion to the Cauca-
sus region, he notes in a letter to his wife that mny of the deportees had simply not re-
turned because they “were taken too far inland.” As Robert Shenk notes, such statements 
suggest that, in part of his mind at any rate, “Bristol thought the deportees were just living 
elsewhere, in a more hospitable region (as some Turkish propagandists claimed).”13 On the 
other hand, later in the same letter to his wife, Bristol acknowledges the real Turkish pur-
pose for the deportations: “Greek women and children w re first put in the Turkish bath in 
mid-winter then driven into the country only half aive” and were then left to die “by the 
wayside of hunger and cold. This was the so-called ‘white death.’” But, shortly after de-
scribing such events, Bristol’s letter adds a caveat to the whole grisly act: “These massacres 
were terrible beyond description and yet the Greeks and Armenians are most unattractive 
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and in some ways have irritated the Turks.”14 One year later, he would make a similar re-
mark in another letter: 
 
“The Armenians have for centuries suffered under Turkish rule and in recent years 
have been subjected to massacre, deportations, and m y cruelties, but it is useless for 
anyone to disguise to himself the personal characteistics of the Armenians.15 Through-
out his reports, when discussing ongoing or past massacres against Christians, Bris-
tol’s refrain amounts to ‘horrible massacres… however. Deportations… but.’” 
 
So odd could Bristol’s line of reasoning be that in he aftermath of a Nationalist offen-
sive, Bristol went so far as to blame the Armenians for resisting the Turkish attack. In June 
of 1921, the American consul in Aleppo wrote the State Department and Admiral Bristol 
about the heroism of the Armenian population in Aintab. During a prolonged siege of the 
Armenian quarter, they had protected not only themselve  but the American missionaries 
and doctors who were working there. Bristol’s response to the consul was odd to say the 
least: “I was very glad to hear the reports of the fight the Armenians put up in Aintab and I 
think they undoubtedly prevented a massacre or a wholesale killing at that time, but this 
may only be laying up trouble for themselves in the future… Sometimes discretion is the 
better part of valor.” Not quite satisfied with the fairness of this conclusion, Bristol engaged 
in his usual rhetorical maneuvering and added: “The urks, undoubtedly, want to get rid of 
the Armenians and will probably exterminate them if they cannot find another means.”16 
This “other means” would, presumably, be deportation. As previously noted, Bristol had 
already, in a letter to his wife, concluded the intended purpose of the deportations. It’s hard 
to imagine that he’s somehow forgotten. 
What then could lie behind Bristol’s inconsistent li e of reasoning? To what ends is his 
“pragmatic naïveté” deployed? In his August 1921 repo t, Bristol writes of sending a de-
stroyer to Batoum after a long discussion with his as istant Allen Dulles, the future director 
of the CIA, and the brother of future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Bristol states 
that, even though being instructed not to offer official assistance to American business in-
terests in conducting business with Bolshevik Russia, he sent his destroyer to Batoum to 
investigate whether a line of communications could be opened as a prelude to regular visits 
in the future. He did this not only in the interest of American business, but also in the hopes 
of assisting American relief organizations. He writes: 
 
“I made up my mind to take the position that the three Republics of the Caucasus 
are autonomous governments and not a part of Soviet Russia, although the form of 
government, so far as we know, of all three of these r publics is a soviet Govern-
ment. In this particular Mr. Dulles and I agreed. The question then arose as regards 
lending assistance to American business men and this was discussed at some length, 
and Mr. Dulles’ principal objection was that in rendering assistance to American 
business interests we might compromise the position that our Government had taken 
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in all its negotiations with Soviet Russia in this particular. Again I arrived in favor 
of considering the autonomous Governments of Azerbaijan, of Georgia, and of Ar-
menia, as separate from Soviet Russia, and, even though controlled by Soviet Rus-
sia, they were no different from other autonomous governments, for instance 
Greece, which is controlled by Great Britain.”17 
 
Here, Bristol contends that Greece is, in August of 1921, controlled by Great Britain. 
This is not quite in line with the reality of the matter. While Britain was cooperating with 
Greece, after the removal from office of Eleftherios Venizelos in November of 1920, Brit-
ish support for Greek efforts in Asia Minor had been withdrawn. However, the British did 
still maintain a strong level of economic leverage over the Greek government, and used 
Greek held areas in Asia Minor to serve as a check upon American imports ‒ a fact that 
Bristol complains about in his reports. In a sense, it would appear that High Commissioner 
Bristol views the conflict between the Turks and Greeks as a proxy conflict between the 
British and the Americans. 
In Bristol’s reports, it is made repeatedly clear that it is the Greeks who are responsible 
for the ills of the region. He may at times, as we have seen above, acknowledge the atroci-
ties committed by the Turks during the war, but at nearly every step of the way he down-
plays their enormity and fails to consider the possibility of providing reparations or security 
for the survivors. At most, Bristol suggests that the actions of all the local peoples are 
equally foul. Quite likely, he sees the Turkish crimes as a fait accompli and believes that 
the appropriate response for the “greater good” is to allow the process to work itself out so 
that the ethnically dominant Turks can re-impose order on the region. This order, Bristol 
thought, would also be beneficial to American busine s. 
Furthermore, the deportations of minorities and the seizure of their property could also 
be seen as a step towards progress for the future Turkish state. Moreover, Bristol appears to 
have accepted that the methods by which Turkish Nation lists wished to make progress, 
namely through an etatist approach, was not necessarily invalid. There was more behind the 
American policy of open trade than just dollars and cents. For decades, America had pro-
moted free international trade and the navy had been foremost in furthering, and at times 
enforcing, this Open Door policy. As Bryson notes: 
 
“ […] economic expansion is but one side of the coin of the Open Door, for pro-
gress, reform and modernization of social and political institutions constitute the re-
verse… Reform, progress, and modernization of social and political institutions in 
underdeveloped countries was… a concomitant benefit that would accrue through 
heightened economic activity.”18 
 
Similarly, Woodrow Wilson had put forward, in his Fourteen Points, that freedom of 
trade is important not merely to spread economic benefits but also to induce social and po-
litical modernization. Yet the Open Door policy as well as Wilson’s arguments were both 
grounded in a classic liberal “bottom up” view of governance, which held that economic 
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improvements would lead to strengthened institutions, which in turn would lead to stability, 
which in turn would lead to democracy. Bristol may have held this view but he recognized 
that, at least in the Near East, it could run into difficulties in actual practice. His approach 
to Anatolian issues actually exhibits a strong appreciation of the competing “top-down,” 
government-centered, approach to solving social and economic problems. First and fore-
most in Bristol’s view, the Turkish Nationalists would, as Bryson notes, ultimately bring 
“the benefits of modern civilization; that is, good government, liberty of religious belief, 
universal education and at some future time the right of self-determination.”19 Bristol’s 
faith in the Nationalists’ ability to bring about positive social change via a top-down ap-
proach marks a shift – one which was not uncommon among progressive elements in the 
United States at this time – toward an acceptance that modern government had to take an 
active role in social and economic engineering. An examination of Bristol’s formal corre-
spondence, written in the 1930s, to and from major political figures such as J. Edgar Hoo-
ver,20 indicates that he was sympathetic towards the application of top-down governance 
even within America’s borders. 
Bristol’s acceptance of the possible validity of top-down government in the region, and 
his readiness to excuse the Turks for their wartime and postwar atrocities, may well be be-
cause he viewed the annihilation of Christian communities and the concomitant seizure of 
goods and property as acts that were ultimately leading to the establishment of a secure sta-
ble state. Concerning the economic motive behind the wartime Ottoman policy of seizing 
Christian-held property, Ryan Gingeras writes in his work Sorrowful Shores: 
 
“Istanbul’s approach to abandoned property facilitated a collective solution of two 
problems that had lingered since the Balkan Wars. The acquisition of movable 
goods on farms and businesses by recently founded Muslim companies helped to 
complete the process begun during the boycott of 1914 and served further to 
"strengthen the culture of trade among Muslims" that w s so crucial to building a 
national economy. Expropriation of Christian land also held the added bonus of 
supplying the tens of thousands of refugees who remained without homes or work 
since 1912. As a result, all property formerly associated with local Rum [Greeks] 
and Armenians appeared up for grabs.”21 
 
Economics played a role in Wilson’s vision of a new order, and though America had 
never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, the region still held a place in Wilson’s 14 
points. Further, his aims for the region were in themselves the means to an end: the end be-
ing the creation of more liberal societies, the bedrock of which was to be social and politi-
cal stability grounded in economic growth. Wilson’s aims for the region had two main 
components. First, he aimed to internationalize the Straits in order to advance free global 
trade. The final portion of Wilson’s thirteenth point stated that the Dardanelles should be 
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open to free passage under international guarantees. S cond, Wilson wished to prevent the 
further Allied partitioning of the Near East. Bristol was apparently appointed in order to 
achieve these aims and did so, though by means that would probably have surprised Wilson. 
Both of Wilson’s main aims are apparent in his cool response to an early peace effort, 
one promoted by Henry Morgenthau, the former American Ambassador to the Ottoman 
Empire, in the summer of 1917. Secretary of State Lansing thought Morgenthau’s chances 
of success were slim, but was excited at the chance to achieve peace without victory; 
Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, showed no interest in the scheme.22 In the end, 
Morgenthau’s group of peace envoys never made it further than Spain. Wilson, in a note to 
the State Department, made his views clear: 
 
“Arrangements must be made at the Conference which closes the war with regard to 
Constantinople which could hardly be made if Turkey were first made peace with. 
Indeed, I suppose that peace could be made only at terms which preclude any radi-
cal changes of control over Constantinople and the Straits. The only advantage to be 
gained would be to prevent the bargains of the Allies with regard to Asia Minor 
from being carried out [in other words, to prevent territorial partitioning].” 23 
 
In a sense, Bristol’s efforts did achieve Wilson’s two primary aims for the region ‒ to 
make the Straits internationalized, and to develop the economy in Asia Minor. However, 
the means by which this goals were achieved would likely have surprised Wilson. Bristol 
consistently sided with Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists, and thus through siding with 
them, gained good favor for the United States. The urkish National Pact (misak-ı millî), 
signed in 1920, allowed for the internationalization of the Straits, and this was what Kemal 
brought forward when trying to avert a crisis with the Allies after the Greeks had been ex-
pelled from the region.24 The Straits were internationalized, and the partitioning of Asia 
Minor was prevented. Further, the success of the Nation lists seemed to hold the promise of 
a strong unified state capable of developing the natio l economy. 
Despite these successes, the desire of Wilson and Bristol, that of a liberalized economy 
was not realized, nor was there an increase of Turkish American trade. Bryson characterizes 
the situation well, but fails to note a significant reason why trade remained moribund and 
why the Turkish economy could not rebound: 
 
“Unfortunately, Admiral Bristol’s efforts did not result in increased American trade 
with Turkey. Statistics and commerce reports on American trade indicate a marked 
decline after 1920 and show no appreciable increase by the time Bristol departed 
Turkey at the conclusion of his tour of duty in 1927. The economic climate in Turkey 
in the decade of the I920’s simply did not provide an incentive conducive to Ameri-
can investment, because the cautious Turks, shunning the possibility of further for-
eign economic control, opted for etatism, a policy not at all guaranteed to attract 
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foreign capital. It was not until the following decade that American investors exhib-
ited an interest in Turkey as a field for investment.” 25 
 
Mustafa Kemal’s statist policies, as Bryson observes, did hinder economic growth and 
foreign investment in the region. However, Bryson’s article is too cut and dried, for it only 
focuses on apparent economic realities, government policies, and Bristol’s efforts to expand 
and support American trade in the region. Consequently, it misses or steers clear of several 
crucial elements that explain why economic growth in the region was destined to be stag-
nant whatever the economic policy of the new regime n Ankara. In doing so, Bryson 
avoids what should be seen as Bristol’s greatest deviation from Wilsonian liberalism while 
in pursuit of more tangible goals, namely Bristol’s failure to condemn or prevent the Na-
tionalists’ ongoing destruction of minority communities, nor to condemn their precursors 
ethnic cleansing in Asia Minor during the First World War. Bryson fails to call Bristol to 
account, first because he ignores both the destruction of Smyrna at the hands of the Nation-
alists and the economic consequences, and second because he fails to note the economic 
implications of the expulsion of the Greeks, the destruction of their communities, as well as 
the near-total annihilation of the Armenians. Smyrna stood as the trade capital of Western 
Anatolia, and its destruction, was the final blow to a region that had suffered from ethnic 
conflict since 1912. 
Even some Turkish Nationalists were puzzled at the ne dless destruction of economic 
assets. Turkish journalist Falih Rıfkı, who was himself a Nationalist, observed of the de-
struction: 
 
“Why were we burning down İzmir? Were we afraid that if waterfront mansions, ho-
tels and restaurants stayed in place, we would never be free of the minorities? When 
the Armenians were deported in the First World War, this same fear made us burn 
down all the neighbourhoods fit to live in, in Anatolian towns. This did not derive 
from a simple urge to destroy. A feeling of inferiority had a part in it. It was as if 
anywhere that resembled Europe was destined to remain Christian and foreign and 
to be denied to us.”26 
 
Andrew Mango, in his biography of Atatürk, adds that the expulsion and extermination 
of the Christian minorities was catastrophic for the region, as they were the craftsman that 
the Turkish economy had relied upon. For example, th  Turks, who were known for the 
prowess of their cavalry, had to rely on Armenian frriers. Those craftsmen were now 
gone.27 Mustafa Kemal himself recognized this problem. In a public speech in Bursa shortly 
after the burning of Smyrna, he compared the “general ignorance” of the Turkish popula-
tion to a disease. “We will acquire knowledge and science wherever they are to be found 
and we will stuff them into the head of every indivi ual in the country.”28 Bristol was hop-
ing to expand trade in a depopulated wasteland that had an extreme dearth of the knowledge 
and talent required for economic expansion. 
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Bryson also fails, then, to try to make a comparison with a neighboring country that 
Bristol harbored no end of ill-will towards ‒ Greece. Greece was, in 1921, importing from 
the United States as much as all the rest of the Balkan nations combined. Further the 
American trade commissioner to Greece noted in 1929 that it was the United States that had 
emerged as the greatest foreign influence there.29 This at a time when, as Bryson observes, 
American trade in Turkey was floundering. 
Summed up, Bristol’s instructions were “do what is right, and protect American inter-
ests.” Judging by the loss of trade in Asia Minor, and the expansion of trade in Greece, it 
seems that, ironically, Bristol might well have served American interests to a far greater ex-
tent had he attempted to focus on doing what many people at the time would have consid-
ered to be morally right, rather than focusing on the protection of immediate American in-
terests. By ignoring the Nationalists’ destruction and expulsion of Christian minorities, he 
was ultimately doing a serious disservice to the int rest of trade, which if he and Wilson 
could be believed, were to lead to the economic sucess and social improvements that were 
key to a more liberal international order. However, as previously noted, a far greater fear 
for Bristol was that another great war could break out over the spoils system, the Allies’ 
efforts to divvy up the whole region. And as Wilson wrote of Morgenthau’s failed peace 
attempt with the Ottomans, Wilson was balancing the desire for the internationalization of 
the Straits along side thwarting Allied territorial agreements in Asia Minor. Further, if Bris-
tol did, in fact, see the annihilation of Christian communities as effectively being a f it ac-
compli, then it could be that he felt the interest of peace was ultimately served by allowing 
the inter-communal blood-letting to come to a conclusive end. By siding with the National-
ists against Allied territorial aims, Bristol was trying to ensure what he and Wilson viewed 
as the two chief deliverers of a more inclusive liberal international order: peace and free 
trade. It must be noted, however, that by ignoring the plight of dispossessed and endangered 
minorities, while also ignoring the issue of justice for the Armenians, he was ultimately set-
ting the stage for a future tyrant to remark, “Who remembers the Armenians today?”30 
Bibliography  
Archival Sources 
Mark L. Bristol Papers, 1882‒1939. LCCN mm 79013854, MSS13854, Box 1, November 
1919; Box 3, August 1921. 
Secondary Sources 
Beers, Henry P. “United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919‒24.” Military 
Affairs 7, no. 4 (1943): 209‒220. 
Blakemore, Erin. “How the Treaty of Versailles Ended WWI and Started WWII.” National 
Geographic, May 31, 2019. www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/ reference/treaty-
versailles-ended-wwi-started-wwii/ Accessed May 5, 2020. 
                                                
29 Cassimatis, American Influence in Greece: 1917‒1929, 10. 




Brecher, F.W. “Revisiting Ambassador Morgenthau’s Turkish Peace Mission of 1917.” 
Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 3 (1988): 357‒363. 
Bryson, Thomas A. “Admiral Mark L. Bristol, an Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey.” Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies 5, no. 4 (1974): 450‒467. 
Cassimatis, Louis. American Influence in Greece, 1917‒1929. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Uni-
versity Press, 1988. 
Gingeras, Ryan. Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Em-
pire, 1912‒1923. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
MacMillan, Margaret. Six Months That Changed the World: The Paris Peace Conference of 
1919. London: John Murray, 2001. 
Mango, Andrew. Ataturk. London: John Murray, 1999. 
Manela, Erez. “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and 
the Revolt against Empire in 1919.” The American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (2006): 
1327‒1351. 
Robertson, David. Dictionary of Modern Politics. London: Europa Publications, 2002. 
Shenk, Robert. America’s Black Sea Fleet: The U.S. Navy Amidst War and Revolution, 
1919‒1923. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012. 
High Commissioner Bristol’s Implementation of Wilsonian Internationalism in Asia Mi-
nor and Its Shortcomings 
This article is an examination of the commonalities and incongruities between Woodrow 
Wilson’s liberal internationalism and the conduct of Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, Amer-
ica’s High Commissioner in Turkey. The article uses both secondary and primary sources 
to investigate Bristol’s policies and statements. I focuses on his lack of concern for the 
plight of the Armenian and Greek communities in Asia Minor, and his efforts to support 
American businesses and protect them from restrictions placed by other Allied powers. The 
article finds that while Admiral Bristol failed to consider issues of justice for minority 
communities in Turkey, he did, in fact, seek to improve the likelihood of a democratic fu-
ture for the region by pursuing the Open Door Policy, the internationalization of the Straits, 
while also attempting to counter European designs o the region. While his aims were 
aligned with Wilson’s desires, Bristol’s methods and callousness towards minority commu-
nities were not in keeping with Wilson’s vision. 
 
